This was a natural area of interest for someone interested in both strategy and ethics and setting up a business school in Cambridge, where the people bringing the topic to public attention in both the UK and the US were all alumni. My work here has two interacting themes: a theoretical critique of the uses of agency theory to determine CEO pay and a more empirical and sociological exploration of how governance relationships actually work.


The Principal’s Other Problems: Honest Incompetence and Management Contracts
Academy of Management Review 27: 98-113 (2002) 200+ cites
CEO Pay, Motivation and the Meaning of Money
SSRN 2021972 (2012). Abridged version in Executive Compensation Briefing, 9(6), 2-7.
Can Company-fund Manager Meetings Convey Informational Benefits? Exploring the Rationalisation of Equity Investment Decision Making by UK Fund Managers
Accounting, Organization and Society, 37: 207-222 (2012) (with Richard Barker, John Roberts and Paul Sanderson)
Managerial Discretion and the Practice of Corporate Governance
SSRN 2029289 (2012)
In the Mirror of the Market: The Disciplinary Effects of Company – Fund Manager Meetings
Accounting, Organization and Society, 31: 277-294 (2006) (with John Roberts, Paul Sanderson and Richard Barker) 100+ cites
Owners or Traders? Conceptualisations of Institutional Investors and their Relationships with Corporate Managers
Human Relations, 59: 1101-1132 (2006) (with Paul Sanderson, Richard Barker and John Roberts)
Beyond Self-interest: Agency Theory and the Board in a Satisficing World
British Journal of Management, 16: S55-S64 (2005) 50+ cites
Responsible Ownership, Shareholder Value and the New Shareholder Activism
Competition and Change, 11(3): 223-240 (2007) (with Paul Sanderson, Richard Barker and John Roberts)
Regulating the Corporation: The Role of the Institutional Investor
Corporate Ownership and Control, 3 (1): 127-134 (2005) (with Paul Sanderson, Richard Barker and John Roberts)
Why Executives should be Banned for the Board
Unpublished discussion paper, 2004