Moral departures and moral resources in bureaucratic and post-bureaucratic organizations

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ABSTRACT

In this paper I shall address three questions: (1) What characterizes the routine departure from socially accepted moral values in business organizations; (2) What resources do we draw on and what resources might we most appropriately draw on as business ethicists and business ethics teachers to counter this; and (3) How do the answers to these questions differ between bureaucratic and post-bureaucratic organizations and contexts? Drawing on a range of sociological studies, I shall argue that both traditional analytical approaches to business ethics and alternatives such as virtue ethics and phenomenological ethics are of limited use in countering the moral departures of contemporary business, but that both Habermasian discourse ethics and Confucian ethics may provide more promising alternatives.

Introduction

Although there are always disputes at the borders (abortion, genetic engineering, sexual behavior), the basic moral values of American society are well understood.[1] They are the values of a morality of obligation in the Judaeo-Christian tradition, of most if not all of the Ten Commandments, and of the Golden Rule. "I just believe that we were put here by God to love and care for each other and to make a difference in this world", said one of the interviewees in Alan Wolfe's mid-1990s survey of middle-class American values.[2] And, suggested Wolfe, most people would agree with that, as well as with the precepts of honesty, respect, and all the other "ordinary duties" of traditional morality. As well as being well understood, these moral values are widely, almost universally shared. They may be honored in the breech as well as in the observation, but in their families and communities most people routinely affirm them and refer to them as the basis of moral judgment. In business, however, these values often appear to be suspended, not merely in exceptional cases but systematically, as a matter of routine.

As business ethicists we respond to this situation all the time. It is, indeed, our raison d'être, and shapes the territory of our discipline. But we rarely analyze its origins, or the appropriateness or otherwise of the (mainly philosophical) resources we bring to its resolution. At a time when many businesses are changing their organizational forms, with a consequent reshaping of the demands and expectations of managers, it seems appropriate to revisit this issue. In this paper I shall address three questions: (1) What characterizes the routine departure from socially accepted moral values in business organizations; (2) What resources do we draw on and what resources might we most appropriately draw on to counter this; and (3) How do the answers to these questions differ between traditional bureaucratic organizations and the more flexible organizations characteristic of what has variously been called the "flexible economy", "new capitalism" or "post-bureaucracy"?[3]

Moral departures in business bureaucracies

The relationship between ethics and business bureaucracy is contentious. Recent theoretical treatments of bureaucracy have tended to stress its morally disabling characteristics. Robert Jackall, for example, contrasts the contemporary world of corporate bureaucracy with an earlier era of individual entrepreneurship and the protestant work ethic. Bureaucracy, he suggests, erodes morality by separating action from responsibility and work from salvation. The structure of the bureaucracy comes between a person and the effects of her actions, bureaucratic rules replace the rules of a moral community, and a narrowing career hierarchy encourages competition rather than cooperation.[4] From the very different perspective of European critical theory, Zygmunt Bauman and Richard Stivers argue that the bureaucratic technologies of the twentieth century removed first the need and then the capacity for individual moral choice.[5] For Stanley Deetz, writing within the same critical tradition, bureaucratic managerialism in particular reduces all decisions to economic costs and benefits and denies,

suppresses or throws back into the private world of the manager anything to do with values.[6]

In an older theoretical tradition, however, bureaucracy was closely associated with morality. For Emile Durkheim, the bureaucratic structures of the professions acted not to separate people from moral communities as Jackall would have it but to tie them in to the moral constraints of society. From Durkheim's perspective it was the individual entrepreneur, his self-interest unconstrained by any intermediate institution, who was most likely to depart from moral norms.[7] Similarly in the cultural theory of Mary Douglas, bureaucracies share the hierarchical character and moral values of society at large. Both are collectives in which the common good is achieved by a coordination of effort, in which different people occupy different, well-defined roles and are subject to clear, well-defined rules, including rules for moral behavior. A characteristic ethic of duty and mutual obligation ensures that those at the top of the hierarchy are responsible for those at the bottom and so maintains social solidarity.[8]

These different perspectives stem partly from different theoretical traditions (Weberian versus Durkheimian, American versus European).[9] However, they also reflect different preoccupations, and this suggests a partial reconciliation. Thus, while cultural theory is concerned primarily with how different types of culture function, the more critical theoretical approaches are concerned mainly with how they *mal*function. So a well-functioning bureaucracy may well exhibit all the characteristics of a traditional hierarchically structured moral community, but when it begins to malfunction the resulting moral departures may also be characteristic of its bureaucratic structure. That this is indeed the case becomes apparent when we turn from the theory of bureaucracy to empirical studies of moral behavior in bureaucratic corporations.

Business ethicists tend to argue their cases from a repertoire of case studies, prepared either to pose a problem or to illustrate a point, and similar in kind to those used in business pedagogy generally. However, the most incisive studies of moral practice in traditional business organizations have been by sociologists working in the ethnographic tradition, most notably Melville Dalton, Joseph Bensman, and Robert Jackall. In seeking to understand empirically how the moral practices of business have departed from those of society at large, these scholars have focused on a variety of factors, but two in particular stand out. One is the unintended effect of bureaucracy. The other is the effect of self-interest.

Dalton's *Men who Manage*, based on studies of three factories and one department store in the late 1940s and 1950s, did not start out as a study of morality, but in exploring the conflicts and power struggles he observed in these organizations he was led to reflect on the moral predicaments with which managers were faced.[10] The fundamental source of these predicaments was, he suggested, an unavoidable clash between administrative logic and social demands in commercially oriented bureaucracies. Faced with the complexities of real life, business bureaucracies simply could not operate as theory intended. In particular, the rigid bureaucratic designs of the organizations Dalton studied could not cope with the complex and changing demands of customers, with unpredictable production or maintenance problems or problems with suppliers, or with the

human frailties of employees. A human need to personalize situations and respond to emotion as well as logic meant that the interactions between offices were almost inevitably affected by the personalities and personal relationships involved and so departed from the logic of the organizational design. And the people who occupied the different bureaucratic roles did not always fit the requirements of those roles: nor could they, given the limitations of bureaucratic procedures for hiring and promotion.

These observations were not new. Barnard, Argyris and Dimock, among others, had already noted the tensions between bureaucracy and human nature, and Blau and Gouldner had also discussed the need for bureaucratic organizations to depart from the Weberian ideal-type if they were to work efficiently, even in the public sector.[11] What Dalton did, however, was to explore in detail the implications for managerial behavior. Faced with the inevitable failings of the bureaucratic system, he observed, the only way in which responsible managers could make their organizations work effectively was by going beyond their formally assigned roles and breaking the formal rules. And once these rules were broken, both moral conflicts and departures from accepted moral standards became inevitable.

For example, unable to solve a production problem or to meet customer demands within the normal operating rules, a manager might resort to some form of informal remuneration in kind for a key operative. Considerations of fairness might then lead to this being extended to others and becoming viewed as a right, while at the same time the formal requirements of the bureaucracy meant that it could only be continued by subterfuge. With the passage of time an honest attempt to meet the needs of the corporation became transformed into a form of institutionalized theft.[12] Within management, the needs of the corporation might lead one manager to circumvent others who, whilst fulfilling the formal requirements of their offices, could not do what was actually needed. Since the rules did not allow this to be done openly, it had to be done covertly, again leading to subterfuge, dishonesty and exploitation. At the same time the manager might call on others, who might not be so well suited to the formal requirements of their offices but were good at managing informally (or who were, indeed, just decent, hardworking and committed employees) to exceed their formal briefs. Again some subterfuge would be required, and personal moral obligations would be established which might later conflict with the obligations of office.

Once managers began to depart from the formal rules, the problem of role fit created a vicious circle, as managerial jobs increasingly demanded informal management skills that formed no part of the official job description. All this opened the way for political action (the main emphasis of Dalton's account was on the politics of management cliques) and the pursuit of individual self-interest. In a politicized environment in which the most effective managers were precisely those most able to work around the rules, while maintaining an upward semblance of working within them, conspiracy and deception flourished. As well as seeking what was best for the organization, managers had no option but to look after their own interests, and those of their associates. Some inevitably took this further,

exploiting the situation to advance their own interests against those of the organization.

The picture Dalton presents is not, on the whole, one of straightforward immoral behavior, whether by intention or by default. A few of the managers he observed could arguably be described in this way, but they were the exception rather than the rule. The picture is rather one of people seeking to act morally, to do their best for the business and behave decently to their colleagues, but being forced by the failings of the bureaucratic system to achieve those moral ends by immoral means, by deception, subterfuge, and the exploitation of those who were not their close colleagues. The pursuit of self-interest is also a part of the picture. Dalton notes that those who seek careers in business, rather than in other areas, typically have, and indeed need, a very strong regard to their own self-interest. He also notes that bureaucracy may cause more problems in America than in the less individualistic and more stratified cultures of Europe.[13] But the driving force in his picture is "getting things done" – "getting what you want" comes later.

Much the same can be said of the picture of the advertising industry in the 1960s as presented by Joseph Bensman.[14] In Bensman's account, the advertising agency, organized on bureaucratic lines, is an extreme case of the commercial bureaucracy described by Dalton. The non-routine nature of advertising work, with its high pressures and tight deadlines, its constant sense of crisis, is peculiarly ill suited to formal modes of organization. The impossibility of making any objective assessment of a project or contribution means that presentation is everything. Together with the high and uncontrollable risks that go with it, and the irresolvable tensions between business-oriented account managers and the creative and technical staff, this ensures a high level of politicization, and the relatively small scale of the agency ensures that politics are highly personalized.

Again the result is not straightforward immorality, which would be much harder to hide than in an industrial corporation and would quickly destroy the fragile organization, but qualified morality: moral rules that are taken from society but adapted to the peculiar demands of the business and the exigencies of the bureaucracy. So the ethical rules of the company, according to Bensman, take the qualified forms "Don't tell an unnecessary lie", or "Don't lie, cheat, steal unnecessarily".[15] Honesty is desirable, wherever possible, but advertising is about manipulating the truth, about managing perceptions, and it is accepted in the industry that people sometimes have to lie in order to protect their own self-interest, to protect the agency, or to serve the client. Trust is also important, however, so for relationships with clients, who may not share the industry ethos, the rule gets tightened up a bit: "Don't ever tell a direct lie to the client." Between colleagues too, though lying (when necessary) is acceptable, promise breaking is not.

Bensman also observed more detailed rules, governing behavior within the bureaucratic hierarchy: "Don't squeal to the boss about the dereliction of your peers", "Never denigrate your boss", "Never take credit for your own work unless the boss has publicly acknowledged your contribution", "Take the blame for your boss's mistakes", "Never go over the boss's head", and so on.[16] As in Dalton's

firms, whatever might be needed to get around the restrictions of bureaucracy, appearances must be observed.

A very similar list of rules for behavior in a politicized bureaucracy appears in Jackall's *Moral Mazes*, which is based on research carried out rather later, in the early 1980s.[17] As is apparent from his theoretical position, outlined above, Jackall paints a rather different picture than those of Dalton and Bensman. He is in general much more critical of bureaucracy than they are, and focuses far more on its failings. This difference is not just a product of theory, however: it also reflects a significant difference between the organizations studied. In the organizations studied by Dalton and Bensman, the main driving force behind any moral departure was getting things done, for the benefit of the company. In the organizations studied by Jackall, this was no longer the case. In the two large bureaucratic organizations on which his work was mainly based, both in mature and declining industries (textiles and chemicals), the managers seem to have lost any meaningful sense of the corporate purpose, or of how this might relate either to their own interests or to the common good. The principal goal of each clique or functional group has become its own survival, political maneuvering has become an end in itself, and the pursuit of self-interest is much more prominent.

Despite this change, however, the similarities with Dalton's account are still manifest. The managers' departure from conventional moral standards is again traced to the problems of a commercial bureaucracy and the compromises required if it is to be made to work, with real people filling unreal roles in a demanding and, in this case, hostile competitive environment. It is because the formal structure cannot operate effectively that the informal takes over, bringing with it a raft of moral conflicts and, in Jackall's words, "invitations to jeopardy". The informal economy of the organization seems to have evolved much further than in Dalton's companies and, with the constraint of organizational purpose substantially weakened, the organizational politics and authority structures have become much more personalized. In these circumstances there is a common presumption amongst those interviewed that most managers, especially the more successful ones, are preoccupied with their own advancement. But there is little evidence of such self-advancement. The basic problem, for most of the people interviewed, seems not to be one of advancement but one of survival.

This can be illustrated using the frequently cited quotation from Jackall's book (he uses it twice himself, and again on the dust jacket): "What is right in the corporation is not what is right in a man's home or in his church. What is right in the corporation is what the guy above wants from you. That's what morality is in the corporation."[18] The source of this quote was a classic case of a manager who, in Dalton's terms, fitted the formal requirements of his role but not the informal ones. British rather than American, he was a professional accountant with a strong sense of professional ethics. He was fired after attempting to address a case of the misuse of pension fund surpluses to massage financial results, that turned out to stem from the CEO. He was, in his own words, "too honest for the company".[19] But the oft-cited quotation is effectively that of an outsider. For the other managers Jackall interviewed the problem was not that this guy was too honest, but that he was too naïve and didn't understand the practical compromises

necessary for survival – either his own survival, his colleagues' survival in a politicized bureaucracy, or the firm's survival in the face of hostile financial markets.

A striking feature of Jackall's organizations, compared with Dalton's, is how inward looking they had become. For all the problems they faced in the organization, Dalton's managers were still well connected to the outside world. Indeed, outside connections – through freemasonry, Catholicism and the yacht club – became an important basis for internal cliques. Jackall's managers, in contrast, seem to have become locked into the routines and problematics of their organizations. Both writers noted that the managers they interviewed faced irresolvable conflicts and could not please everybody: whatever they did they were condemned to be condemned by one party or another. But whereas Dalton's managers responded to this by bringing their social (and moral) selves into the bureaucracy, Jackall's responded by shutting them out. They had quite enough to deal with negotiating their way through the corporate politics without importing moral ideals from outside business (however strongly they would themselves support those ideals at home) or worrying, to take other of his examples, about the toxicity of their products or their effluent. Jackall attributes this lack of concern with the social and environmental impacts of the companies' activities primarily to the dulling of critical perspectives induced by bureaucratic routine and compartmentalization, but his discussion points more to a conceptual dissociation between the corporation and its external stakeholders.

These differences are to some extent specific to the companies studied and the situations in which they found themselves. Whereas those studied by Dalton and Bensman were relatively healthy and commercially successful, those studied by Jackall were ailing and in decline. But the differences are also illustrative of wider changes in society and perceptions of the self over the period between the two studies. Numerous sociological studies of urban and suburban life have drawn attention to the increasing dominance of private over public roles, and to a withdrawal from social and moral engagement with others. In the second half of the twentieth century middle class Americans (the social group from which managers have predominantly come) appear to have retreated increasingly into suburban isolation and to have exchanged their socially oriented selves for more intimate, even narcissistic identities. As the true or authentic self has come to be associated with the innermost psychological experiences of feelings and desires, so it has become increasingly dissociated from the social and cultural contexts of structured communities and institutions.[20]

This process does not seem to have impacted seriously on the fundamental moral values espoused by the American middle classes. While massive increases in the crime, divorce and illegitimacy statistics have prompted conservative writers, in particular, to lament the demoralization of society,[21] sociological studies of middle class attitudes present a consistent picture of continuing traditional moral beliefs and values.[22] But the process has impacted significantly on the force of public morality. Suburban life appears to be characterized by what E.P. Baumgartner calls "strategies of moral minimalism", and Alan Wolfe calls "morality writ small". People still believe in traditional moral values, but in a

world in which tolerance has become the greatest virtue they have become increasingly reluctant to impose their beliefs on others, or to react publicly to moral wrongdoing.[23] The external resources on which a conflict-ridden manager can draw have declined and morality has become an intensely private affair. Departures from morality, in consequence, no longer have to be justified in a public arena, but only to oneself. As sociologists Robert Bellah and associates have expressed it in their classic study of middle class American life in the early 1980s, *Habits of the Heart,* "each self constitutes its own moral universe, and there is finally no way to reconcile conflicting claims about what is good in itself. … In the absence of any objectifiable criteria of right and wrong, good or evil, the self and its feelings become our only moral guide."[24]

Moral departures in post-bureaucratic business

One of the first sociologists to explore these issues of private and public selves was Richard Sennett, in his now classic study *The Fall of Public Man,*[25] and they are also a central feature of Sennett's recent ethnographic study, *The Corrosion of Character*, the first and, as yet, the only significant empirical study of moral practice in post-bureaucracy.[26] In an earlier work with Jonathan Cobb, *The Hidden Injuries of Class*, Sennett had explored the moral conflicts of 1960s blue-collar workers in a rigid "old economy" society of white-collar ideals, and the ways in which the work ethic gave meaning to the lives of these people.[27] In *The Corrosion of Character* he explored the implications of post-bureaucracy for the same group of people in the 1990s, but he also extended the scope of his study to include the managerial middle classes.

From Sennett's perspective, the key feature of the new capitalism or flexible economy is the replacement of routine by flexibility – of rigid bureaucracies by flexible network and market-based organizations, using flexible contracts and work patterns, and with all the individual risks and uncertainties that attend this. An important consequence of this is the replacement of the traditional work ethic, based on a disciplined use of time and delayed gratification, by the short-term ethic of teamwork. The identification of teamwork as a key feature of post-bureaucratic organizations is fairly uncontroversial, but Sennett's portrayal of teamwork, which is based on ethnographic accounts of blue-collar teamwork by Darrah, Graham and Kunda as well as on his own less formal observations, is radically different from the portrayals in management texts.[28] Teamwork, for Sennett, is "the group practice of demeaning superficiality".[29] Teams are characterized by a mask of cooperativeness, but with power no longer constrained by authority they are really arenas for competition. What matters is not "getting the job done", but keeping your place on the team or, for managers, finding a place on the next team. The key to management success in the flexible economy is the ability to network your way from one team to another through the organization (or organizations), always appearing to cooperate but avidly looking after your own self-interest, constantly reinventing yourself, taking credit for successful projects and avoiding blame for failures.[30]

Although Sennett is concerned to stress the differences between traditional and contemporary forms of business organization, his account also highlights important similarities. Contemporary business organizations may be markedly less bureaucratic than their predecessors, in the sense that the roles are far more flexible, the structures are more decentralized and the hierarchy is less well defined; but they are still hierarchical and they still exercise powerful constraints. Indeed, whereas others talk of post-bureaucracy Sennett prefers to talk not of the replacement but of the reinvention of bureaucracy. As in traditional bureaucracies, moreover, the organizational constraints give rise both to moral conflicts and to a defensive pursuit of self-interest. The moral conflicts of the flexible economy arise from the rival moral claims of the organization or project, the team members, and families and others outside the organization. Effective management teams are based on high levels of shared commitment sustained by a strong peer pressure. They work, in effect, by capturing their members' lives. But this effectiveness can only be maintained at the cost of individual freedom and, as the traditional barriers between work and home are eroded, through the neglect of other commitments.[31] As in traditional bureaucracies the responsible manager is driven to compromise, and part of this compromise has to be a defensive self-interest. Dutiful service may be recognized and rewarded, but in a fast-changing and highly competitive environment in which surface impressions are paramount this can never be taken for granted.

Though the mechanisms are different, both bureaucratic and post-bureaucratic organizations thus generate moral conflicts that give rise to moral compromise and to defensive self-interest, which in both cases takes the form of a separation between a manager's actions and the presentation of those actions. In the process, both kinds of organization generate space for a more opportunistic or exploitative self-interest. The role played by this kind of self-interest in old and new style organizations is, however, rather different. In the organizations studied by Dalton and Bensman, it is relatively rare. There are instances of selfish greed and exploitation, but they are not typical and while they may be accepted as an unavoidable feature of business life – business is, after all, about enterprise and market aggression – they are not morally condoned. In the organizations studied by Jackall, self-interest is still for the most part defensive, but opportunistic self-interest seems to have become more common and its illegitimacy more contested. On one hand, by the 'normal' standards of church or home it is still considered immoral. On the other hand, there is a general acceptance that those standards are not applicable to organizational life and that in the organizational context it is self-interest that is normal, and morally acceptable. In the world explored by Sennett, this tension has evaporated and self-interest has become morally legitimate. After a brief reaction in the early 1990s against the 1980s call that "greed is good", it is now accepted throughout much of the business community that greed *is* good, because greed drives enterprise and enterprise creates wealth.[32] Wealth is good both as an end in itself and because wealthy societies can in general be relied upon to have high moral standards.[33] Managers today are expected to act competitively, as individual market entrepreneurs. They are

expected to serve their companies, too, but from a calculated, short-term self-interest rather than from any deeper sense of duty.

There is no evidence that this increased acceptance of market egoism has led to any increase in corruption or other such forms of blatant individual immorality. As we have already noted, most people still hold to the traditional moral values. But when self-interest rather than duty becomes the accepted starting point for business decisions it is inevitable that moral boundaries will become blurred, and that this will be reflected both in individual and in corporate actions. It is notable in this context that the workers described in Gerald Mars's study of *Cheats at Work*, which pre-dated the move to post-bureaucracy, all occupied situations in which they effectively worked for themselves rather than as part of a corporate community.[34] They knew full well that their fiddling, pilfering and other cheats were immoral in the eyes of society, but they justified them in terms of a legitimate self-interest: their employers (or, in the case of small business entrepreneurs, the state) were not looking after their interests, so they had to look after their own. Managers guided by self-interest will respond differently to opportunities to gain at a firm's or a colleague's expense than will those guided by duty. They will also respond differently to the moral claims of colleagues or subordinates in need. It also seems *prima facie* rather likely that self-interested agents will take a different view of a corporation's reputation and responsibilities to communities or the environment than will dutiful office holders. We noted earlier that the dysfunctional bureaucracies studied by Jackall had already led to a reduced sensitivity on the part of management to issues of environmental and social responsibility – issues that are central to the problematics of contemporary business ethics. In the flexible economy this trend is likely to be continued.

In summary, it may be some time before we get a clear view of the moral consequences of post-bureaucracy, and much more research will be needed if we are to understand its moral dynamics. What we do know suggests that, as for traditional bureaucracy, the origins of the routine departure from accepted moral values lie in a combination of organizational pressures and constraints and entrepreneurial self-interest. However, both the nature of the organizational pressures and the balance between the two factors seem to be significantly different. Self-interest, which emerges from the malfunctioning of bureaucracy, is central to the effective functioning of post-bureaucracy. And whereas business bureaucracies tend to replace the traditional moral rules of society with their own distorted versions of these rules, post-bureaucracy functions by breaking free of rules altogether, and leaving each individual to act as her own moral authority and negotiate her own modus operandi with her colleagues in the organization.

Moral resources for moral departures: the problem of engagement

The moral departures of business form the starting point for business ethics, and they have traditionally been addressed using the resources of applied moral philosophy. The principal aims of business ethicists have been to determine, through the application of a variety of moral theories, what business practices are or are not ethical; to prepare their students (managers and would-be managers) for a moral life by training them in this kind of ethical analysis; and to

develop rules and analytic procedures by which managers in general might determine these things for themselves, without the need for formal ethical training. The question we now ask is: how appropriate is this approach for addressing in practice the kinds of problems we have discussed?

Before attempting to answer this question it is important to be clear about what kind of question it is, and how it differs from other questions that are today being asked both of business ethics and of ethics more generally. I am not questioning here the truth-value of Kantian or utilitarian propositions, or the meaningfulness or applicability of such propositions in social or organizational contexts. Nor am I asking how we should as a society go about developing moral guidelines. My concern is rather with the more immediate question of how, as teachers, writers and consultants, we help managers to make ethical judgments and help them and their organizations to counter and prevent immoral behavior.

To elaborate briefly, I shall not engage here with recent critiques of Enlightenment and post-Enlightenment moral rationalism and calls for its replacement by forms of reasoning more sensitive to specific contexts and situations, as in Alasdair MacIntyre's revival of virtue theory, Stephen Toulmin's defense of casuistry, or Richard Rorty's championing of American pragmatism (carried into the business ethics field by R. Edward Freeman) and European post-modernism.[35] From their very different positions all these authors challenge both the truth claims of Kantian and utilitarian ethics and their validity as a basis for determining what is or is not ethical in a social context – they all argue, indeed, for a morality that is in some way socially constructed. They also all tackle the more practical question as to what part traditional moral reasoning should or should not play in the social and political processes of morality construction. But they do not help us to address the more immediate question of how to prevent the kind of moral departures we witness in a business context.

Robert Phillips and Joshua Margolis's recent critique of the use of moral philosophy to address problems of organizational ethics is at first sight more relevant to this question.[36] They argue that traditional moral philosophy, with its focus on the choices of an autonomous individual, is unable to take sufficient account of organizational context and the interdependence between organizational actors, and that we need to develop an explicitly organizational ethics. This argument is clearly related to the issues we have been discussing, but the main focus is again on moral theory, and to the extent that they engage with the practice of business ethicists, Phillips and Margolis probably misrepresent it. As Edwin Hartman implies in his commentary on their paper, business ethicists are not typically card-carrying Kantians or utilitarians, seeking to 'prove' objectively what is right or wrong. The Enlightenment tradition of moral rationalism is certainly still dominant, but most business ethicists seem to draw on a wide range of theoretical approaches (Kantian, utilitarian, rights-based, contractarian), deploying them pragmatically and in a context-sensitive way, as aids to a reasoned analysis rather than as sources of moral truth.[37]

Much closer to the question being asked here is that posed by Patricia Werhane in her recent study of management and moral imagination.[38] Werhane is concerned, as am I, with the moral departures of basically decent managers

working in basically decent organizations, and with how to prevent these departures. Employing the theoretical apparatus of cognitive psychology, she concludes from the analysis of a group of well-documented cases that moral management requires not only a basic set of socially determined moral standards and the ability to analyze situations from a rational, impartial perspective (or moral reasoning) but also a productive and reproductive moral imagination – the ability to envisage different scenarios and reframe experience in different terms so as to anticipate the possible moral consequences of managerial actions and creatively explore solutions to them.[39] Werhane does not, however, address the question of how the faculty of moral imagination is to be developed in managers. Her psychological analysis points to a significant limitation of the traditional approach to business ethics, but not to how this might be overcome in practice.

In order to address this point here, I should like to return to the sociological perspective of the earlier part of the paper and to a group of studies that characterize the declining force of morality in contemporary society in terms of a lack of moral engagement or moral motivation. Keith Tester, for example, locates contemporary moral culture in a monetarized and media-centered consumer society in which moral concerns have become consumer goods like any other which no longer impact emotionally on the individual:[40]

> We do not think enough about ourselves *in* the world to be able to become aware of the possibility of moral guilt. The happy consciousness, the money system, and plain indifference make sure that the world stays resolutely *out there* and never becomes compellingly in *here*.

In a similar vein, the Croatian sociologist Stepjan Meštrović writes of a "postemotional society",[41] and Ralph Fevre chronicles the replacement of moral engagement by "common sense".[42] Common sense, in Fevre's definition, is a form of sense-making that "requires that we rely solely on reason, that we act towards others only on the basis of what we know and never on the basis of what we take on trust or that which requires an act of faith."[43] Here, "what we know" refers primarily to what we know "*about people*, about their thoughts and behavior",[44] and it refers both to what we *all* know (or know in *common*), and to what we know through the experience of our *senses* – what we see (directly or through television), what we hear (directly or through gossip), and what we read in the papers, but *not* what we feel. Common sense reasoning has no place for feelings or emotional non-sense, and no place for belief, whether religious or humanistic. (It also has no place for the theoretical abstractions and refined experimental methods of science, though it is more sympathetic to science than belief.)

As Fevre stresses, there is nothing inherently wrong in common-sense reasoning. It is not only entirely appropriate but also essential to many aspects of day-to-day living, from shopping to politics. In the last century, however, it has proven so successful that it has gotten out of hand, and has come to be applied in areas where it is not appropriate, in particular to moral issues, where a type of sense-making based upon feeling-based reasoning should properly hold sway. Morality, according to Fevre, has been hollowed out. The façade remains, but whereas moral values once had imperative force they are now seen as mere

emotions. Instead of basing our moral judgments upon feelings and beliefs, we increasingly base them on common sense: what is right is what is usual or, rather, what appears outwardly to be usual.

At first sight, Fevre's conclusion seems to run counter to that of Bellah and his associates, that the self and its feelings have become our only moral guide, but as Fevre makes clear the two accounts are in fact complementary. To the extent that people engage with moral issues they increasingly rely directly on their inner feelings rather than on the social rationalization of moral feelings as socially imposed duties. But they are also increasingly reluctant to engage with moral issues at all, in any meaningful sense, preferring to treat them as if they were merely issues of common sense.

What is interesting about Fevre's analysis in our present context is how well it describes the moral departures discussed in the earlier sections of this paper. His own examples come from other arenas – primarily from the realms of family relationships and sexual morality – but his analysis applies equally well to business ethics. For Dalton's managers, morality was still very much rooted in feelings and beliefs, but Fevre's account of common sense moral reasoning describes perfectly what Jackall found in his dysfunctional bureaucracies. Whatever morality may have meant to the managers he interviewed at home and in their communities, in the business context it was strongly grounded in a common sense of organizational reality. Feelings still counted for something, but only within a very narrow compass. There was some kind of a felt duty to protect one's buddies, but no sense of a feeling-based moral responsibility to others, whether inside or outside the corporation. Fevre's account also meshes well with Sennett's. In the post-bureaucratic context of Sennett's study, even a duty to one's buddies is out of place. The common sense of human behavior has become a sense of competitive self-interest and while people's inner feelings have become central to their sense of identity, they are not publicly expressed. Indeed, any expression of feeling or emotion by others is automatically suspect.

Of course, belief is no guarantee of goodness. Feelings and emotions can be harmful as well as beneficial and are notoriously unreliable as a foundation for morality. Even the more outspoken critics of Kantian and utilitarian claims to absolute moral objectivity, such as Rorty and MacIntyre, are agreed on the need for some kind of rationalizing process within moral reasoning, incorporating some notion, albeit limited, of moral objectivity. Whether or not they need other faculties, such as moral imagination, deciding a difficult moral issue, judging between rival moral claims, and working out how to apply agreed moral standards to new or complex situations, all need rational argument, and to that extent the traditional approach of business ethicists is surely appropriate. But even if we set aside the familiar problem of whether or not rational moral judgments are sufficient to motivate moral actions, people also need some reason to engage their rational or imaginative faculties in the first place, some ground for moral engagement. Whatever else they may or may not do, feelings, emotions and beliefs provide this.[45]

These observations from the sociological literature appear to be reflected in the classroom. I know of no formal surveys here but informally, in my own

experience, business ethics students routinely report that the resources of traditional moral philosophy *do* help them to identify, clarify and resolve the moral issues of business. They also report, however, that this moral philosophy leaves them cold. What motivates them to take morality seriously and learn how to reason about it is either religious belief, or an emotional reaction to cases of perceived injustice or immorality, or a deep-felt concern for their fellow humans.

The traditional approach to business ethics has been to effectively separate the questions of motivation and analysis, and to focus attention overwhelmingly on the latter. As teachers we may begin by seeking the moral engagement of our students, but we quickly move on to the applications of moral philosophy, taking their engagement for granted. As writers and consultants, we plunge straight into analysis. Moreover, the analytical philosophies we use explicitly deny a role for feeling. As Zygmunt Bauman has expressed it, the emotions are un-reasonable, so reason has to be un-emotional:[46]

> Most ethical arguments follow unstintingly Kant's invalidation of emotions as morally potent factors: it has been axiomatically assumed that feelings, much as acting out of affections, have no moral significance – only choice, the rational faculty, and the decisions it dictates can reflect upon the actor as a moral person.

If our students and readers and the managers with whom we work were sufficiently morally engaged, this neglect of the emotional dimension might not be a problem. In such circumstances, it would be reasonable to assume that their agenda as management practitioners was much the same as ours is as (morally engaged) applied philosophers, namely to work out analytically the implications of moral theory for difficult cases, extend its applications to new areas, and develop guidelines on which the ethical codes of business corporations might be based. (The managers interviewed by Dalton half a century ago might well have benefited from such an education, and their companies from such guidelines.) If, however, we start from the proposition that in the contemporary world of post-bureaucratic organizations and dysfunctional bureaucracies, moral engagement is itself seriously problematic, this approach is less obviously appropriate.

Some business ethicists evidently recognize this. In one of the most popular business ethics textbooks of recent years, *Managing Business Ethics*, Linda Treviño and Katherine Nelson barely touch on moral philosophy but effectively base their whole treatment on the question "Why bother?". In a vivid illustration of Fevre's thesis, however, they make no attempt to engage their readers' feelings, but address the question almost entirely from a common sense perspective, using sensation-based reasoning focused on issues such as media attention, the operational and (especially) the legal costs of immorality, the benefits for recruitment and reputation effects.[47] They use this kind of non-emotional, common sense reasoning because it is the kind of reasoning that has become dominant within the management and MBA communities with which they interact, and in one sense it evidently works: it makes morality seem relevant. It only does so, however, by hollowing it out, in Fevre's terms, by removing its specifically moral dimension.

Combining feeling and analysis

As business ethicists, one of the key challenges we face is how to recognize and educe the feelings necessary to moral engagement, while at the same time promoting the rational analysis necessary for considered moral judgment. In the contemporary world, and in contemporary post-bureaucratic business organizations, we can rely neither on bureaucratic rules and regulations to provide ready-made answers to moral issues nor on religious belief to engage people's moral attention or place them in thrall of moral authority. Within the Western philosophical tradition, however, feeling and reason are typically seen as in conflict, not as complementary.

As we have already noted, the philosophical traditions of analytical ethics have little or no place for feelings or emotions. The other main stream of contemporary Anglo-American ethics, deriving from Aristotelian virtue theory, is similar in this respect.[48] By focusing attention on people rather than on acts or consequences, virtue ethics arguably gets closer to the human relationships that are the primary focus of moral feeling. By locating moral truth in the practices of a political community rather than in abstract principles, it is also able to give appropriate recognitions to the particular social and organizational contexts of business practice – an important advantage in the light of our earlier discussion. However it still treats individual feeling as something inherently dangerous, to be controlled by the (socially) objective and (locally) universalizable reason of the polity.

On the other hand, the phenomenological tradition of post-Kantian, post-Heideggerian "continental" philosophy, which takes seriously the problem of moral engagement and the part played by feeling in this, finds no moral role for rational analysis. Thus Martin Buber's conception of (wo)man as defined not by reason (as for Kant) or in existential solitude (as for Heidegger), but in terms of the I-Thou relationship, is powerfully engaging.[49] But Buber also insists that the moment we rationally reflect upon this moral engagement with another, we lose it. Emmanuel Levinas, for whom the essence and first experience of humanity is an unconditional responsibility for the other, likewise sees reason (in the sense of logical analysis) as destructive of morality.[50] In the words of Zygmunt Bauman, whose *Postmodern Ethics* draws heavily on the work of Levinas,[51]

> [M]oral issues cannot be 'resolved', nor the moral life of humanity guaranteed, by the calculating and legislative efforts of reason. Morality is not safe in the hands of reason, though this is exactly what spokesmen of reason promise. Reason cannot help the moral self without depriving the self of what makes the self moral: that un-founded, non-rational, un-arguable, no-excuses-given and non-calculable urge to stretch towards the other, to caress, to be for, to live for, happen what may.

There have, however, been some attempts to resolve this opposition between moral feeling and moral analysis, and I shall conclude this paper by briefly discussing one of the more recent of these, Habermas's discourse ethics, alongside a much older tradition with which it has some affinities, namely Confucian ethics.

In his discourse ethics, Jürgen Habermas suggests that moral judgments might be reached entirely rationally but through a process of inter-subjective rather than objective reasoning, with the diverse members of a community bringing their different emotionally or socially constructed conceptions of virtue and the good life as the starting points for a rational dialogue in which each seeks both to challenge and to empathize with the positions of the others.[52] In Habermas's account, our moral feelings are, like perceptions in general, potentially misleading, but the existence of moral feelings is critically important, both as a foundation for moral discourse and as an indication of some deeper moral truth. Despite taking on board many of the social constructivist objections to Kantian ethics, Habermas remains in many respects a Kantian, maintaining that the process of rational argument can in principle result in a universal (though not a transcendental) moral truth, and that while we might not be able to construct such a truth as rational individuals, without engaging in social discourse, we can recognize it.[53]

In his theoretical sociological study of bureaucratic managerialism, Stanley Deetz drew on Habermasian ideas to explain how business bureaucracies *prevent* moral discourse,[54] but they might also be used a valuable resource for business ethics, especially if combined with more feeling-oriented perspectives. A number of philosophers, for example, have recently explored ways of combining discourse ethics with the moral insights of Levinas.[55] Discourse ethics does not itself provide us with answers to the moral dilemmas of business, or with rules or guidelines for the prevention of moral departures. But it does provide us with a philosophical framework that takes such rules and guidelines seriously, and that also takes seriously our moral feelings and emotions. It also suggests a procedure for putting all these to the test, whether in the classroom or the organization.

Another resource that seems particularly well suited to the problems with which we are now faced is the ethics of Confucianism. In her recent study of Confucian and Watsujian ethics Daryl Koehn has demonstrated convincingly that Confucianism can be made the basis of an ethics of business and has made a strong case for making it the foundation of a contemporary global business ethics.[56] Her argument, which shows some similarities to that of Habermas, emphasizes on one hand its recognition of the multiple goods and values of a pluralist society and on the other hand its emphasis on rational dialogue or reason-giving.

Like discourse ethics, Confucian ethics seeks moral wisdom through a reasoned and context-sensitive dialogue based on moral feelings or intuitions, which are taken to indicate some deeper universal moral truth. Instead of seeking universal moral rules, however, it remains focused on the moral worthiness of the individual. It is, in effect, a kind of virtue ethics, but one that has more in common with religiously based systems of virtues than with Aristotelian virtue ethics. For Confucius, as for Aristotle, appropriate behavior is very much a function of social position, but it is grounded in a universal notion of humanity. Just as the Christian or Buddhist virtues are applicable to all humans, regardless of context or position, simply because they are humans, so the cardinal Confucian virtue, *jen** , which has been variously translated as human-heartedness, loving-kindness,

benevolence, or simply virtue, is an attempt to capture the universal essence of humanity. Unlike the religious ethical traditions, however, Confucianism is humanistic: it is compatible with religious belief, but it does not depend on it.

In a world in which beliefs still matter at the personal level but the social authority of religion in general, and of any one religion in particular, has been greatly reduced, the humanistic approach of Confucianism seems utterly appropriate. In the context of post-bureaucratic business organizations, in which the formal rules characteristic of bureaucracy are being replaced by informally negotiated patterns of expectation, Confucianism's emphasis on individual virtue within a specific social situation, rather than on general rules of behavior, also seems to be an appropriate resource to counter moral departures.

Confucian ethics and discourse ethics are surely not the only resources with which we can usefully address the problems of moral departures in contemporary business, nor are they without problems of their own. They do however suggest how we may begin to respond to the types of problems discussed in the first and, especially, the second parts of this paper. If we are to encourage moral behavior in business, as in other spheres, we must engage people's moral attention, and in the absence of any powerful moral authorities that means appealing to their moral feelings, emotions and beliefs. Having done that, we must engage them in a rational debate, but in such a way as to take account of a plurality of goods and of the complex social and institutional contexts of business and organizational relationships. In business in particular, we must also find a way of both recognizing the claims of a legitimate self-interest and, at the same time, testing these claims against the legitimate moral claims of other interested parties.

Notes

1   This observation, and much of the paper, also seem to apply to Western society more generally, but the sociological evidence is predominantly American and it is consequently American society and business with which I shall be primarily concerned.

2   Alan Wolfe, *One Nation After All*. New York: Viking, 1998, p.4.

3   Richard Sennett, *The Corrosion of Character: The Personal Consequences of Work in the New Capitalism*. New York: Norton, 1998; Charles Hecksher and Anne Donnellon, eds, *The Post-Bureaucratic Organization*. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage; Chris Grey and Christine Garsten, "Trust, control and post-bureaucracy", *Organization Studies*, **22** (2001): 229-250.

4   Robert Jackall, *Moral Mazes: The World of Corporate Managers*. New York: Oxford University Press, 1988.

5   Zygmunt Bauman, *Modernity and the Holocaust*. Cambridge: Polity, 1989; Richard Stivers, *The Culture of Cynicism: American Morality in Decline*. Oxford: Blackwell, 1994.

6   Stanley Deetz, *Ethics in an Age of Corporate Colonization*. Albany, NY: SUNY Press, 1992.

7   Emile Durkheim, *Professional Ethics and Civic Morals*. London: Routledge, 1957; *Moral Education*. New York: Free Press, 1973. For a review of Durkeim's theory and its implications for contemporary management see John Hendry, "After Durkheim: An agenda for the sociology of business ethics", *Journal of Business Ethics*, **34** (2001): 209-218.

8   Mary Douglas, *Natural Symbols: Explorations in Cosmology*. Second edition. London: Routledge, 1973. See also John Hendry, "Cultural theory and contemporary management organization", *Human Relations*, **52** (1999), 557-577.

9   Weber himself did not explicitly connect his theory of bureaucracy with his work on the protestant ethic, but he was well aware of the tensions of bureaucracy and both Jackall and the critical theorists can be seen as working in a Weberian tradition.

10   Melville Dalton, *Men Who Manage: Fusions of Feeling and Theory in Administration*. New York: John Wiley & Sons, 1959.

11   Chester I. Barnard, *Organization and Management*. Cambridge MA: Harvard University Press, 1948; Chris Argyris, *Personality and Organization*. New York: Harper, 1957; Marshall E. Dimock, *The Executive in Action*. New York: Harper, 1945; Peter Blau, *The Dynamics of Bureaucracy*. Chicago: Chicago University Press, 1954; Alvin Gouldner, *Patterns of Industrial Democracy*. New York: Free Press, 1954.

12   For a fuller development of this theme see Gerald Mars, *Cheats at Work*. London: Allen & Unwin, 1982.

13   Gouldner, *op. cit*., also makes this point, as does C. Wright Mills, *The Power Elite*. New York: Oxford University Press, 1956. It is notable that Michael Crozier's study of French public-sector bureaucracies in the late 1950s revealed none of the moral conflicts of Dalton's study. However, Crozier's organizations were not only public sector and European but also much simpler structures, with much simpler aims. Michael Crozier, *The Bureaucratic Phenomenon*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1964.

14   Joseph Bensman, *Dollars and Sense: Ideology, Ethics, and the Meaning of Work in Proft and Nonprofit Organizations*. New York: Macmillan, 1967, pp.1-70. Bensman's account is an informal one, based on real life experiences rather than on a planned research project (at the time of his observations he had moved out of academe into an advertising

career), and devoid of the usual academic apparatus. The aim is to present things as they are rather than to analyze why they might be so. But it is nevertheless the account of a sensitive and sophisticated sociologist who has made major contributions to several areas of sociology, including the bureaucratisation of American society, the construction of the self and the construction of craft knowledge.

[15] *Ibid*., 51ff.

[16] *Ibid*., 61.

[17] Robert Jackall, *op.cit*.

[18] *Ibid*., 6, 109.

[19] *Ibid*., 109

[20] On changing attitudes to the self see in particular Joseph Veroff, Elizabeth Douvan and Richard A Kulka, *The Inner American: A Self-Portrait from 1957 to 1976*. New York: Basic Books, 1981; Joseph Bensman and Robert Lilienfeld, *Between Public and Private: The Lost Boundaries of the Self*. New York: Free Press, 1979; Robert N. Bellah and associates, *Habits of the Heart: Individualism and Commitment in American Life*. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1985; Richard Sennett, *The Fall of Public Man*. New York: Knopf, 1977. On the characteristics of the suburb see especially M. P. Baumgartner, *The Moral Order of a Suburb*. New York: Oxford University Press, 1988.

[21] See for example Gertrude Himmelfarb, *The De-Moralization of Society: From Victorian Virtues to Modern Values*. New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1985. In common with other conservatives, Himmelfarb attributes this demoralization to social democracy and the welfare state. For an alternative (and more optimistic) view of the same data see Francis Fukuyama, *The Great Disruption: Human Nature and the Reconstitution of Social Order*. New York: Free Press, 1999.

[22] See especially Baumagartner, *op.cit*.; Wolfe, *op.cit*.; Alan Wolfe, *Moral Freedom*. New York: Norton, 2001.

[23] Ralph Fevre has offered an interesting analysis of the Clinton-Lewinsky affair, during which public opion shifted from a minority believing Clinton to be guilty but a majority supporting strong punitive measures should he be lying to a majority believing him guilty but a minority supporting punitive action. The opinion polls also showed from the beginning that these responses were strongly linked to political allegiances. Fevre interprets this as the emergence of a "common sense" view (explained below) based on a reading of the opinion poll, taking over from a view based on moral feelings. An alternative interpretation, in line with the findings of Baumgartner and Wolfe, would be that people took a strong moral stand in response to a hypothetical situation, but a much weaker one in response to real behavior. See Ralph Fevre, *The Demoralization of Western Culture: Social Theory and the Dilemmas of Modern Life*. London: Continuum, 2000.

[24] Bellah et al, *op.cit*., p.76.

[25] Sennett, *op.cit*.

[26] Richard Sennett, *The Corrosion of Character: The Personal Consequences of Work in the New Capitalism*. New York: Norton, 1998.

[27] Richard Sennett and Jonathan Cobb, *The Hidden Injuries of Class*. New York: Norton, 1972.

[28] Sennett, Corrosion of Character. Charles N. Darrah, *Learning and Work: An Exploration of Industrial Ethnography*. New York: Garland, 1996; Laurie Graham, *On the Line at Subaru-Isuzu*. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1995; Gideon Kunda, *Engineering Culture: Control and Commitment in a High-Tech Corporation*. Philadephia, Temple

University Press, 1992. See also Amanda Sinclair, "The tyranny of a team ideology", *Organization Studies*, **13** (1994), 611-626; James Barker, "Tightening the iron cage: concertive control in self-managing teams", *Administrative Science Quarterly*, **38** (1993), 408-437.

29   Sennett, *Corrosion of Character*, p.99.

30   Other analysts of post-bureaucracy have been more cautious about its ethical implications, but have reached similar conclusions as to its general implications for the self. See for example, Christina Garsten, "Betwixt and between: temporary employees as liminal subjects in flexible organizations", *Organization Studies*, **20** (1999): 601-617; Christina Garsten & Christopher Grey, "How to become oneself: discourses of subjectivity in post-bureaucratic organizations", *Organization*, **4** (1997): 211-228.

31   On the impact of post-bureacracy on home commitments see, for example, Arlie Hochschild, *The Time Bind: When Work Becomes Home and Home Becomes Work*. New York: Metropolitan, 1997; Christina E. Nippert-Eng, *Home and Work: Negotiating Boundaries through Everyday Life*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1995; Tony Watson & Pauline Harris, *The Emergent Manager*. London: Sage, 1997.

32   For a detailed exploration of this claim see John Hendry, *Between Enterprise and Ethics: Business and Management in a Bimoral Society*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, forthcoming.

33   Evidence for a link between affluence and morality depends largely on "ultimatum" experiments, the interpretation of which is far from straightforward. See for example Colin Camerer & Richard H. Thaler, "Anomalies: ultimatums, dictators, and manner", *Journal of Economic Perspectives* **9** (1995): 209-219; Robert Heinrich and associates, "In search of homo economicus: behavioural experiments in small scale societies", *American Review* **91**(2) (2001): 73-78. In the popular American mind, however, the superior morality of affluent and capitalist societies seems to be taken for granted.

34   Gerald Mars, *Cheats at Work*. London: Allen & Unwin, 1982.

35   Alasdair MacIntyre, *After Virtue: A Study in Moral Theory. 2nd edition*. London: Duckworth, 1985; Stephen Toulmin, *Cosmopolis: The Hidden Agenda of Modernity*. New York: Free Press, 1990; Albert R. Jonsen & Stephen Toulmin, *The Abuse of Casuistry: A History of Moral Reasoning*. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1988; Richard Rorty, *Contingency, Irony and Solidarity*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989. E. Edward Freeman, "Divergent stakeholder theory", *Academy of Management Review* **24** (1999): 233-236.

36   Robert A. Phillips & Joshua D. Margolis, "Toward an ethics of organizations", *Business Ethics Quarterly* **9** (1999): 619-638.

37   Edwin M. Hartman, "Moral philosophy, political philosophy, and organizational ethics: A response to Phillips and Margolis", *Business Ethics Quarterly*, **11** (2001): 673-686.

38   Patricia H. Werhane, *Moral Imagination and Management Decision-Making*. New York; Oxford University Press, 1999.

39   Werhane traces the notion of moral imagination back to Adam Smith, and also draws heavily on the recent work of Mark Johnson, *Moral Imagination*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1993. The failure of moral imagination was also a central feature of Hannah Arendt's account of Eichmann: Hannah Arendt, *Eichmann in Jerusalem: A Report on the Banality of Evil*. New York: Free Press, 1963.

40   Keith Tester, *Moral Culture*. London: Sage, 1997, at p. 150.

41   Stepjan Meštrović, *Postemotional Society*. London: Sage, 1997.

42   Fevre, *op.cit*.

43   *Ibid*., p.18.

44   *Ibid*., p.15.

45   See Amitai Etzioni, *The Moral Dimension: Towards a New Economics*. New York: Free Press, 1988; Bellah et al, *op.cit*.; Fevre, *op.cit*.

46   Zygmunt Bauman, Postmodern Ethics. Oxford: Blackwell, 1993: p. 67.

47   Linda Treviño and Katherine Nelson, *Managing Business Ethics*. 2nd edition. New York: Wiley, 1999.

48   See for example MacIntyre, *op.cit*.; Michael Slote, *From Morality to Virtue*. New York: Oxford University Press, 1992; and for an application to business ethics Robert C. Solomon, *A Better Way to Think about Business*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999. The writings of communitarians such as Michael Sandel also fall within this general Aristotelian tradition.

49   Martin Buber, *Between Man and Man*. London: Fontana, 1961. *I and Thou*. New York: Scribners, 1958.

50   Emmanuel Levinas, *Totalité et Infini*. Martinus Nijhoff, 1961; *Otherwise than Being*. The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1974.

51   Bauman*, Postmodern Ethics*, p.247. The title is rather misleading, as Bauman's book effectively turns postmodernist thinking on its head – and Levinas is by no stretch of the imagination a postmodernist.

52   Jürgen Habermas, *Moral Consciousness and Communicative Action*. Oxford: Polity, 1990.

53   For a lucid discussion of Habermas's relationship to other ethical traditions see Thomas McCarthy's introduction to Habermas, *ibid*.

54   Deetz, *op.cit*.

55   See for example Enrique Dussel, *The Philosophy of Liberation*. Maryknoll, NY: Orbis Press, 1985; and in a business ethics context Bert-Willem van de Ven, Rationaliteit en Ethiek in de Onderneming. Tilburg: Tilburg University Press, 1998.

56   Daryl Koehn, Local *Insights, Global Ethics for Business*. Amsterdam: Rodopi, 2001.